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Intubation of the Irreversibly Comatose: 
A Response to Robert Barry, o.P. 
Rev. Edward J. Bayer, S.T.D. 
Falher Barer is a proFessor oFlllora/ Ihe%gr al Ihe Pontific'a/ College 
.Io.I'l'/Jhilllllll ill CO/II III h liS. Ohio. 
Rev. Robert Barry reviews contribut ions to Br No EXlraorclinarr 
Mealls in Lillacrl:'. November. 1987. incl uding my own chapter in the 
book. He is correct about at least 0111:' thing: The euthanasia mentality is 
indeed very dangerously looming over the land and polluting the moral air 
of medici ne today. He is correct also in seeing the move to esta blish a "right 
to suicide" as an esse ntial component of the euthanasiasts' strategy. The 
ascendancy of the euthanasia movement very much threatens our world 
with a new version of the totalitarian horrors of the Nazi movement. only 
now on perhaps a worldwide level and with a different kind of dictatorial 
"planners" to impose their "new order" . Unfortunately. one of the most 
powerful ploys being used by euthanasia promoters today is the plight of 
the irreve rsibly comatose - particularly their intubation for feeding and 
hyd ration. 
My own view. and that of many. if not most. moralists working out of 
the officially committed moral doctrine of the Cathol ic Church. on the 
issue of intubation of the irreversibly comatose draws . I believe . on 
principles validly developed in Catholic moral tradition over the centuries. 
This view. as I wou ld present it. can be outlined as follows: 
I) Any man-made contrivance to replace a natural function of 
the bod y is of necessity a burden. for instance. a stomach tube 
to replace the natural process of ingestion . or a dialysis 
machine to replace kidney function. or a respirator to replace 
diaphragm function. etc. These would not necessarily be a 
burden of such significance as to exempt one from using them 
to prolong life. But they are of necessity a burden. at least to 
so me degree. 
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2) It is clear that such is indeed the case if one compares , on the 
one hand, the normal human reaction to the prospect of 
having to have a stomach tube for a few months after a throat 
operation to, on the other hand , the normal human reaction to 
having to eat meals by normal ingestion for the same period. 
No one looks forward to the first; any normal person naturally 
looks forward to the second. 
The only way one could deny the intrinsically burdensome 
nature of such artificial substitutes for normal bodily 
functions would be to deny the moral validity of both 
sentiment and conviction in the common estimate of the 
human race. Such a denial is foreign to the Catholic moral 
tradition, not to mention sound systems of rational ethics. 
3) What is always a burden becomes a sign((icant burden if it 
must be continued over a long period of time. Thus feeding 
and hydration by intubation over a long period of time are a 
significant burden, this, regardless of pain, great expense, etc., 
being involved or not. Simply "putting up with it" is more than 
burden enough. 
To deny this, one would somehow have to convince himself 
that the normal human person would look forward to such an 
arrangement. That is unthinkable. And there is only one basic 
reason why: the arrangement is a significant burden . 
Who in his right mind would look forward with gloom to the 
prospect of eating three square meals a day normally for the 
next 20 or 30 years? No one! Who would look forward to being 
fed by a stomach tube for 20 or 30 years? No one with common 
sense! Why not? Because it is a significant burden. 
4) It follows inexorably, then, that one would have a moral right 
to exclude such an arrangement for oneself, and even make 
provision ahead of time for such an exclusion in the 
eventuality that one would become totally incompetent at 
some later date. One always has a moral right to exclude 
life-prolonging measures which are significant burdens. 
5) One still retains the moral option to use even a procedure of 
significant burden. But it is an option, not an obligation. One 
might choose freely such an option IF there were some 
compensation in sight for putting up with the significant 
burden involved. Opportunity for prayer, study, visits with 
family and friends, etc. might lead a person - freely, without 
any moral requirement to do so - to choose the life-
prolonging option in spite of its significant burden. 
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6) The point with the irreversibly comatose is that only in the 
rarest cases is there any compensation. Therefore only in the 
rarest cases is there any obligation to continue tube feeding for 
a presumably extended period of time. (If the irreversibly 
comatose person will be kept alive for only a short period of 
time - say two weeks - by such feeding , such feeding 
becomes morally optional because it is a significant burden by 
reason of its futility.) The option of such artificial feeding may 
be present , but not the obligation. 
In my opinion, Father Barry's review does not really give adequate 
consideration to the approach outl ined above . And though he is correct 
about there being a euthanasia threat to our society, he is not correct about 
much else . Indeed his review so distorts and outright misrepresents the 
truth , I believe , that it does a distinct disservice to the pro-life movement 
and especia lly to the movement's concern to protect the life of the seriously 
ill. I believe that, regrettably, this is obvious particularly in his critique of 
my own contribution to the book. 
The distortion shows itself when Father Barry does not quote my words, 
but instead , gives his interpretation of them. Two examples out of, 
unfortunately, many will suffice to show the distortion. 
He says that, according to me , 
... nutrition and nuids ... when they cannot be ingested [in a normal manner] 
become electable medical treat ments . 
This is a highly simplistic version of my views. Indeed , it contradicts 
what I actually said in the chapter. 
First of a ll , I never called nutrition and fluids " medical treatments", 
because I consider the term not very helpful. For the Catholic moral 
tradition of the centuries has considered, not only "medical treatment", 
but even the normal ingestion of significantly burdensome food or 
medicines - even those necessary for life - sometimes morally 
"electable", i.e., non-obligatory, e.g., if they are extremely expensive. 
Nor did I say that food or fluids delivered hr tuhe are simply "electable". 
Indeed, I said the contrary: 
A means of prolonging life is "obligatory on its own merits" when one must 
answer yes to all three of the following questions: 
a) Is thi s means physiologically possible to the patient'l 
[Obviously . one is not obliged to give . e.g .. intra ve nous treatment if the 
patient's collapsed veins do not allow iLl 
b) Will thi s means substantially pro long Iife'l 
[Obviously. one is not obliged to go through a procedure which will 
stave off death for at most a couple of da ys, ] 
c) Will this means. as a means. escape significantly adding to the burdens 
of the patient" 
[On the one hand . obviously. one is not obliged to perform highly 
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painful, major surgery when no anesthes ia is available or usa ble. The 
surgery. preciseir as a means. would sign ificantly add to the burd en of 
the patient. The answer to the question would th en be "No" - mea ning 
that the procedure all iTS 0 11 ' /1 m eriTs would not be ob li ga tory. On the 
other hand , if it does not add burden as a means. but does so simrly by 
prolonging a li fe which a lready has much mise ry inhere nt in it, the 
answer wou ld be " Yes" - mea ning that the procedure is mora ll y 
obligatory. Thus . if the ot her two questions a lso had to be answered 
affirmative ly, the rrocedure would be morally obligatory.] (p. 91. 
emphasis and bracketed inse rt s add ed .) 
As I explained in the chapter (ibid.), "o bligatory on its own merits" 
means simply "obligatory" - period! There would be no moral excuse for 
not using a procedure which "tests positively" under these three questions. 
Thus , it is obligatory to give a simple, short-term antibiotic to a totally 
comatose patient whose life is threatened by pneumonia. I even make the 
point (ibid.) that procedures "non-obligatory on their own merits" can be 
rendered obligarory for non-therapeutic reasons . How then can Father 
Barry report - simplistically - that I make such treatments merely 
"e lectable"? To say that a certain procedure may somerimes and f or 
objecrive reasons be electable, i.e., morally optional, is not the sa me as 
saying simply that it is electable all rhe rime. 
Another example of a breakdown in logic regards another contribution 
to the book . 
.. .food and I\'OTer are different from respiraTOrs .. . patients can often survive the 
definitive removal of respiraT ors, but no one can survive the definiti ve and 
absolute removal of/ood and I\'OTer. (Lin acre, p. 88, emphas is added) 
Father Barry is here illogically comparing, on the one hand, absolure 
physical necessiries ("food and water" - and, of course, air would be in the 
same category) with , on the other ha nd , the conrrivances ("respirators" 
and, of course , tubes for artificial feeding would be in the sa me category) 
by which one might deliver them: in other words, "apples and oranges", as 
the saying goes in elementary logic courses. 
Father Ba rry's review not only distorts what I did say, but also 
misrepresents what others have said. I will give on ly one , and a rather 
serious, example. Father Barry writes: 
Bayer would permit Elizabeth Bouvia to sta rve herself to death, but Archbishop 
Roger Ma hon y of Los Angeles cond emned as irrational a [California Court of 
Appeals] decision permitting that choice. (Linacre, p. 89) 
Actually the Archbishop accepted as morally defensible Elizabeth 
Bouvia's rejection of tube feeding. What he condemned (and rightly so!) was 
the euthanasia reasoning behind the decision, not the decision itself. He 
issued a lengthy statement which makes this point repeatedly. (See p. 83) 
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T rue , a mora l approach which, to the contrary, va lues each human life as a 
priceless gift can nonetheless justify not adding heavily to the burdens which 
already fill a patient's life . If ta king food artificially, or even na turally, in a 
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patient's honest judgment is a source of significant pain. discomfort . risk or even 
dehumanization added to what he is already experiencing or will experience from 
his condition. one can defend the patient's right to say "No more!" This is a 
reasonable decision worthy of a human being, and nineteen hundred years of 
coherently developing Christian moral thinking affirm it. For it is not a decision 
to end one's earthly life. but to tolerate that life's passing away (as we all must 
. someday) rather than adding new burdens to those already present in one's life . 
Indeed , society has a right - even an obligation - to protect a patient's right 
to make this eva luat ion of the burden in a procedure and decisions which follow 
from it, even though at times others may disagree with a particular patient's 
thinking and choice in the matter. The [Appeal Court's] opinion ... appears at 
first to contain much which is supportive both of the moral obligation not 
precisely to end life , and of the right to refuse procedures precise/)' because they 
significantly add burden. Elizabeth's present willingness to take whatever 
nourishment she can manage by mouth (even though she cannot long survive on 
this) would indicate primafacie an intent to do the same . 
. . . true mora ljustification can be found for Elizabeth's refusal of intubation . . 
(emphasis added). 
It should be evident that the Archbishop champions precisely the very 
points and approach to which Father Barry objects in my chapter. 
Perhaps Archbishop Mahony has changed his mind since he issued this 
statement. To my knowledge, however; he has given no evidence of that. If 
he does change, I would take that change very seriously, for I have 
profound respect for both his mind and his episcopal charism. 
Perhaps the Church will someday embrace Father Barry's ideas . Once 
again, I see no sign of that. "One swallow maketh not a Spring," 
Shakespeare notes. And four archbishops cited by Father Barry make not 
"the Church" which Father Barry maintains has spoken on this issue. 
- not even if two of them are Cardinals and all of them on my list of hero 
pastors. I am especially concerned, however, about the highly 
questionable precision or even the out-and-out imprecision with which 
Father Barry handles the nature and content of their statements. As for the 
Pontifical Academy of Sciences, actually it was not the Academy, but a 
"working group" - a kind of subcommittee - which presented the report 
the Holy Father. It was a very short report with only one sentence touching 
the issue of the comatose, and no elaboration of reasons behind that 
sentence. The last advisory group to present its findings to a Pope on a 
truly dramatic issue was, of course, the "Birth Control Commission" 
- and we know just how authoritative that report was. 
We should remember, too , that a group's "findings" can be rejected not 
only for being too lax, but also for being too rigoristic. I believe that is 
exactly what is going to happen to the opinion that we must keep a 
permanently comatose person alive, perhaps for 10 or 15 years by 
intubation. If, however, the Church does accept Father Barry's 
conclusions, I have every intention of accepting them exactly as the 
Church then indicates I should accept them - even though I will have a 
problem making sense of them. 
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Perhaps, finally , Father Barry or someone else someday will come up 
with truly impressive arguments that we are morally obliged to use medical 
contrivances to supply food and fluids to the irreversibly comatose even 
for 10 or 15 years. But, once again , I have seen no such arguments -
certainly not in Father Barry's critique or in his other writings. Indeed , I 
believe that his efforts to make his point are proving counterproductive to 
his cause - and, unfortunately, I say with regret, to the pro-life movement 
as a whole. If what he maintains is actually true, I hope that he soon finds 
the logic and the facts to convince us all. As of now, at least In my 
judgment and that of many of my colleagues, he is not doing so. 
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